Abstract. e aim of the study is to analyze the amount of foreign direct investment invested in the Ukrainian economy by Polish businessmen after Poland's accession to the EU in comparison with those investments that were made in the same period from Ukraine to Poland. Polish entrepreneurs are interested to invest in the economy of Ukraine, because they believe that the Ukrainian market is attractive to them against the backdrop of the problems that are currently going within the EU countries. In particular, the investment attractiveness of Ukraine is proved by its advantageous geographic location, large domestic consumer market, skilled labor force.
INTRODUCTION
e analysis of export-import trade fl ows between Ukraine and Poland compels paying primary attention to the causes that for a long time give rise to the existence of some constraints and restrictive barriers in the Polish-Ukrainian trade. As already noted, these reasons have both objective and subjective sources of their own creation, and their negative eff ect applies not only onto bilateral trade cooperation between Ukraine and Poland, but also appears in the sphere of investment cooperation between the two countries. As a result, most of the above problems and structural imbalances highlighted by the example of UkrainianPolish trade in goods and services are refl ected in the investment dimension.
is primarily refers to the discrepancy between the total amount of FDI invested by Polish entrepreneurs into the Ukrainian economy and Ukrainian -into Polish, as well as sectorial and structural heterogeneity of the fl ow appropriate investment of resources between Ukraine and Poland.
us, analyzing the amount of foreign direct investments invested in the Ukrainian economy by Polish businessmen after Poland's accession to the EU in comparison with those investments that were made in the same period from Ukraine to Poland, prior attention is drawn to the wide variations of these parameters as a whole, and within individual years in particular (Table 1) . On average during 2005-2010 the total amount of FDI involved into Ukraine from Poland exceeded the same amount of export of Ukrainian investments into the Polish economy by 16 times. us in some periods (2007) this ratio amounted to 22.3 times, and as of January 1, 2011 was more than 19 times. However, in general, the said ratio for Ukraine during 2007-2010 ranged between 4.8 -6.5 times, and as at the beginning of 2011 there was three times inferior disparities between involved and invested foreign direct investments between Ukraine and Poland. In addition, in 2010 there was extracting Ukrainian equity of Poland against 69.9 million of invested FDI from Poland to Ukraine. is suggests that in fact, in 2010 the ratio between the annual volume of attracted foreign direct investment from Poland to Ukraine and volume of investment resources invested in return by domestic entrepreneurs into Poland was more than 70 times, while the total annual fi gures for exports and imports of foreign direct investment into Ukraine with all countries during 2010, this ration was only 7.2 times. e situation is complicated by the fact that foreign direct investments into Ukraine from Poland are greatly less than those within the investment cooperation between Ukraine and other countries of the world.
us, the share of Polish foreign direct investments in the total amount of foreign direct investments to Ukraine during the years of 2004-2010 ranged from 1.3% to 2.3% and the volume of foreign direct investment during one year did not exceed 4.0%, on average accounting for 2.2%.
It should be noted that share of Poland in FDI exports comparing to other countries in the world are much more signifi cant. us, from 2004 to 2010, this fi gure does not fall below 8% (if Ukrainian investments in Cyprus are excluded from the calculation, as they cannot be considered as direct investment, but as a means of optimizing the business tax), and for the last three years was of average almost 11%. As regarded the annual FDI from Ukraine to Poland there is a signifi cant level of diff erentiation indices for individual years, as well as for investment in other states and abroad in general. is indicates a lack of power and consistency of local business, but would also demonstrate a signifi cant level of attractiveness of the Polish market for Ukrainian capital, despite the fact that in 2010 it was de-investment from Poland at the amount of 0.3 million US dollars.
Note that just as in trade of goods and services in the Ukrainian-Polish investment cooperation there is a gap between the observed volume of investment fl ows and calculated values of potential investments from Poland to Ukraine, obtained by applying the gravity model (Table 2 ). Unfortunately, it was not possible to analyze compliance force of economic gravity of foreign direct investment from Ukraine to Poland and other neighboring countries due to the lack of actual statistics and sharp fl uctuations of indicators, but in general we can say that they have identifi ed the parameters closer to the estimated level than in the case of attracted foreign direct investment into Ukraine. As can be seen from the data, Poland, along with Belarus, Romania, Slovakia and Moldova is one of those neighboring Ukraine states that have not fully use the available power of the mutual gravitational attraction of economies in terms of foreign direct investment into the economic complex of the country. However, foreign direct investment into Ukraine from Russia and Hungary dominated over the estimated parameters obtained on the basis of using gravity model.
At the same time, it should be noted that underinvestment into the Ukrainian economy from Poland is the least signifi cant of all the above-mentioned countries, especially in comparison with Romania and Belarus. However, over the past two years the amount of the specifi ed underinvestment increased almost by 5 times in absolute terms (from 41.4 to 193.7 million of U.S. dollars) or 14.7% as a percentage (from 6.0% to 20, 7%), or 179 million of U.S. dollars, or 11% compared to 2004 2 . e share of Polish investment into Ukraine does not look the best way, especially comparing to the developed countries and neighboring EU countries. us, if taking as a unit the rates to Germany, the design parameters of the investment from Poland to Ukraine and the other way, obtained on the basis of gravity model show that underinvestment from Poland as of 1 January 2011 was 4 371.9 million of US dollars, or 4.7 times less than potential output based on the coeffi cient of the gravitational attraction of Ukrainian and Polish economies. is gap is comparable with those of Slovakia (5.8 times) and is behind Russia (three times), and signifi cantly ahead of Romania (76.5 times). However, for Hungary, the UK and the U.S.A the fi gures of invested into Ukraine FDI exceed the estimates of investment by 20-30% (Table 3) Analyzing the industrial structure of Polish direct investment into Ukraine, attention is drawn to the fact of signifi cant predominance of investments in the fi nancial sector, in which, as at the beginning of 2011, there is concentrated more than half of the capital invested from Poland to Ukraine. Moreover, since 2006 there has been steady an increase in the share of the fi nancial sector in the total investment (Table 3 .11). e most crucial Polish investors in this segment of the market are banks: Pekao SA (invested into UniCredit Ukraine), PKO BP SA (investment into Kredobank), GetinHolding (invested into "Plus Bank"), as well as insurance group PZU (investment into the company "PZU Ukraine").
Foreign direct investments from Poland into the Ukrainian industry are just over 25% of total investment, and their share has a strong downward trend during the years of [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . is is especially true for the chemical and wood processing industry, whose share in the amount of foreign direct investment from Poland into Ukraine during 2006 -2011 decreased by 14.0% and 10.6%, respectively (Table 4) . e most crucial Polish investments into Ukrainian industry is a factory of building ceramics "Cersanit", fl ooring factory "Barlinek", Furniture Factory "New Style", packaging factory "Ken-Pack", plant of car parts "Inter-Hroklin", factory meat "PKM Duda". Just as in the export and import of goods and services, the lion's share of FDI from Poland to Ukraine is concentrated in the western regions. Kyiv and Kyiv region has also a high share. In general, these regions account for almost 75% of Polish direct investment in Ukrainian economy. At the same time, in the total foreign direct investment into Ukraine, most of the regions that are leaders in the Ukrainian-Polish co-investment do not show much success.
us, the share of Lviv and Volyn regions, which have attracted more than 50% of direct investments from Poland, in terms of all-Ukrainian amount of FDI form all countries accounts for less than 5%, and the share of Lviv, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Vinnytsya oblasts (regions) in economic complexes of which Polish investments play a special role (making up from 14.5% to 46.1% of total FDI into the region, or an average of more than 25% of the index) with the average foreign direct investment at 1, 35% in all-Ukrainian scale (Table 5) is means that the Polish capital does not work on the most powerful domestic markets, being concentrated mainly in the sphere of small business. In the context of realizing the doctrine of strategic partnership, this situation is not quite acceptable. It refl ects caution in the behavior and attitude of Polish investors towards the Ukrainian economy, and their willingness not to invest in highly-valued and long-term-recovered investment projects on the Ukrainian market.
On the one hand, this may indicate underuse of Ukraine possibilities of eff ective cooperation with one of the most promising strategic partners in Europe, and on the other -indicates the absence of appropriate conditions in Ukraine for stable and confi dent work of Polish entrepreneurs who do not feel to be sufficiently protected here.
Experts point out that the main problems of Polish investors in the Ukrainian market are corruption, not transparent legislation, and the insolvency of the counterparties. Polish investors complain about unpredictable behavior of Ukrainian administration, corruption and ineffi ciency of the courts. Almost all of them are experiencing problems with export refunds. Often, the Ukrainian government sets an ultimatum to the Polish businessmen, namely off ering VAT refunds in the case paying a certain amount of fi nancial costs in the form of advance payment of future taxes. Polish companies also suff er from a low payment ability of their Ukrainian partners, banks in particular, which entails blocking implementation of the relevant fi nancial transactions and leads to losses (Polish investors..., 2009).
Besides the VAT debts, Polish businessmen are concerned about the dominance of bureaucracy in Ukraine, the state's inability to eff ectively protect their property rights, the diffi culties of accounting and other (Business community...). In this regard, it is not rare to fi nd the Polish press titles like: "You may lose investment during one day in Ukraine", and relevant publications cite numerous examples of troubles that representatives of Polish companies had in Ukraine, among them Magnus, Star-Print, Hator, Kredobank, Organika, Bioton and others (Pryadko) . All this creates quite an unpleasant image among many Polish entrepreneurs about the specifi cs of the Ukrainian market, repelling them from investing in Ukraine. e situation is complicated by contradictions in the current legislation of our country. In particular, analysts point out that the law on mineral resources is an article which says that the land lot of a license owner should be given by the state. And that is despite the fact that the land had long been privately owned by hundreds of diff erent people. Eff ective legislation on subsoil use in Ukraine does not practically exist. erefore, any offi cer can easily slow down the case (Khudytskyy, 2010) . In this case, investing in major projects and strong industrial sites (or even the development of tourism and hotel network) is rather problematic.
is is becoming an obstacle to the entry of the Polish capital into the key sectors of Ukrainian economy.
In particular, the Polish Ambassador to Ukraine Ya. Klyuchkovsky believes that our government should use the Polish experience in order to improve the competitiveness of the economy. According to him, it will attract into Ukraine not only large Polish, but Western investment: "economy is not only the production of money for the owners of large companies, it is primarily the competitiveness, and Polish experience could be useful for Ukraine" ( e Ambassador things..., 2010). In particular, Poland could take part in the implementation of economic projects in which it has a positive experience and its own interests in terms of bilateral cooperation with Ukraine. First of all, according to the vice minister of the Ministry of Regional Development of Poland Krzysztof Hetman, it refers to the construction of quality roads and border crossing customs at the Ukrainian-Polish border, particularly those that will connect the least developed frontier territory of Ukraine with Poland (Khudytskyy, 2010) .
Even in the crisis year of 2008 a positive trend of Polish investments coming to Ukraine was not interrupted, although a little fall of dynamics of the Polish capital investment into the Ukrainian economy was observed (Figure 2) . Exploring at this background the state and prospects of Ukrainian direct investment of capital into Poland, as already noted, priority attention is drawn to a signifi cantly lower volume of activity of domestic investors on the Polish market than Polish entrepreneurs in Ukraine. is is caused by generally lower potential of the Ukrainian economy, and some subjective assumptions.
First of all, it should be noted that domestic industries, which accumulates the largest share of investment capital, face a number of diffi culties. Firstly, it concerns the large energy consumption in Ukraine which is one of the highest in the world. As a result, the productivity of a metallurgist in the country is in 10 -15 times lower than in the factories of Europe and out of 170 billion m3 of Russian gas that in 2010 was exported almost 35 billion m3 of this strategic resource was directed to Ukrainian economy ( e country that doesn't need energetic independence...). It should be noted that the cost of energy resources for Ukraine is quite high in recent years. And experts predict that the "price of Russian gas for Ukraine in the third quarter of 2011 is projected at $ 350 per 1 thousand m3, and in the fourth quarter, it could exceed $ 400 per 1 thousand m3". It should be noted that the cost of energy resources to Ukraine in recent years is quite high. And this year experts predict that the "price of Russian gas for Ukraine in the third quarter of 2011 is projected at $ 350 per 1 thousand m3, and in the fourth quarter, it could exceed $ 400 per 1 thousand m3" ( e country that doesn't need energetic independence...).
Second, within the economic crisis that has hit Ukrainian economy hard enough, potential of foreign investment to domestic enterprises has signifi cantly decreased, as refl ected in the Ukrainian-Polish investment cooperation. And fi nally -the third reason, which limits the amount of direct investment from Ukraine abroad, including to Poland, is the political instability that causes major domestic entrepreneurs to abandon the strategic development of business models, focusing on the implementation of short-term projects. In this case, the investment capacity of their businesses on foreign markets is substantially limited. National small businesses are not able to make active investments abroad, particularly in Poland, and, although it is their matches at present that are one of the most successful Polish investors on the Ukrainian market. is is due mainly to the specifi city of Ukrainian small businesses, which, in contrast to Poland, so far have not gained suffi cient fi nancial strength and investment potential.
Currently, the most signifi cant Ukrainian investment projects on the Polish market are: Warsaw Automobile Plant (investor -"Auto-ZAZ"), Metallurgical Plant "HutaChenstohova" (Guta-Czestochowa) (investor -"ISD"), ¬ ship building plant " Stocznia Gdanska" (investor -"ISD") and metal-trader "TsentrostalBydhosch" (Centrostal Bydgoszcz) (investor -"UMMC").
CONCLUSIONS
Today Ukraine has not the best reputation among Polish entrepreneurs and partly because of ignoring the repeatedly declared investors' concerns by the authorities. Polish experts stress that the Ukrainian government, which, during the numerous meetings of intergovernmental commissions, economic summits, meetings of presidents and prime ministers, etc., undertook to resolve urgent issues of entrepreneurs from Poland and Ukraine in implementing investment projects unfortunately, was unable to meet its obligations. And it usually concerns not some exceptional problems of Polish investors in Ukraine or special relationship to them, but the general conditions of doing business, creating a favorable investment climate, economic stability and following the rules of the law (Butusov Yu. Jacek Piechota, 2011) .
However, despite the presence of many of these problems, a common interest of Ukrainian and Polish investors and signifi cant integration potential of economies of our countries, are leveling most of them, which is displayed in the constant growth of total amount of direct Polish investment into Ukrainian economy throughout the last decade.
